At Timberland, Ken Pucker helped lead a company that was ahead of its time on corporate sustainability. It powered its factories with renewable energy before it was economic, gave every employee 40 hours of paid community service, and set a mission of “equal parts commerce and justice”.
Then he looked at the footnotes. Timberland’s emissions cuts covered Scope 1 and 2. Scope 3 emissions, which the company couldn’t measure at the time, “were 96% of our total.”
In this episode of Conversations with a CE/O, Ken joins the Foundation’s CEO Joe Murphy to explain why he’s grumpy about “Sustainability Inc.” and why voluntary action can’t fix a broken market alone.
They discuss:
Why market failures stall individual corporate progress
The fight over the New York Fashion Act, and why companies back regulation in private but stay silent in public
What carbon pricing reveals about writing rules that work.
Find out more about Ken’s work here.
Transcript
Click to expand
[00:00:00.200] - Ken Pucker Scope 3 emissions, which we weren't able to measure at the time— we would've had to measure over 500,000 data points to measure that— were 96% of our total. Yeah. So we were congratulating ourselves for reducing 4% of emissions 10% a year, let's say, while the 96% we weren't measuring.
[00:00:19.620] - Joe Murphy Hello, my name's Joe Murphy. I'm a CEO at the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, And welcome to my series on The Circular Economy Show. I sat down with Ken Pucker. Ken's the former COO at Timberland, and he has one big provocation, and that's that all of the current sustainability efforts he would call Sustainability Inc. are effectively a multi-billion-dollar industry built on a flawed idea, and it's not working. So our conversation was about how does the work need to change? What do we need to do differently? Thanks for doing this.
[00:01:01.890] - Ken Pucker My pleasure.
[00:01:02.920] - Joe Murphy The one thing that I learned with my first podcast is to wear socks on the podcast because as you can see up there, we are on camera and I did end up flashing my ankles to the world.
[00:01:12.660] - Ken Pucker You didn't give me the heads up, but I'm grateful that I did wear socks.
[00:01:16.080] - Joe Murphy I did have a spare pair in my bag just in case. Thanks very much for joining us. Tell us a little bit about yourself, Ken. You're self-described as a bit grumpy. Why are you grumpy? And can you expand on that by just sharing a bit about what you've changed your mind on recently? So what did you used to think that you don't think anymore? And why is that leading to a grumpy Ken?
[00:01:42.380] - Ken Pucker So with specific reference to the question of sustainability, I had the good fortune to work for a company for most of my career that was genuinely committed to this agenda. I started working at Timberland at a time the company had just gone public. It was probably about a $160 million company growing very quickly. And for those who don't know the story of the company, the company story is told generationally. The first-generation founder of the company, predecessor company to Timberland, was a Russian immigrant who escaped persecution with a 4th grade education. He's a and started making shoes for low-end women's shoes for department stores. He passed the company on to his 2 sons, Herman and Sidney. They were the ones who created this idea of a waterproof seal with waterproof leather and made up a brand name called Timberland in 1973. In 1985, VF Corporation approached them and offered to buy the company for $60 million. And Herman said, 60 divided by 2 is 30. I'm good. And his brother Sidney said, I want to keep doing this. Sidney had gone to University of Maine and gambled away his tuition money the second week of college, his sophomore year, and hitchhiked home.
[00:03:04.510] - Ken Pucker And so he was more, I think, committed to the idea and more courageous. So the company went public via Merrill Lynch in order to pay out Herman. Right. So Sidney could stay in charge of the company. So Herman left with his 30 and Sidney ended up with the company. Importantly, at the time they went public with a governance structure that had Class B shares. So the family, as long as they owned at least 11% of the outstanding shares, controlled the company, even though it was a publicly traded company. Sidney was my first boss at Timberland, very instinctive, courageous guy, committed to manufacturing. That was his passion. And when I joined the company, Timberland made all of its own shoes and boots in its own factories. 3 of which were US-based, one of which was in Dominican Republic. When he turned 60, he gave the keys to his son, Jeff, 3rd generation, overeducated as compared to grandpa and father, pre-med at Brown, business school at Tuck. And Jeff, by the time he took over, he was less enamored with the traditional business agenda. He'd found faith separately, and in order to combine his faith with his day-to-day, he changed the mission of the company in the year 2000 to be what he called equal partners arts, commerce, and justice.
[00:04:18.900] - Ken Pucker Now, justice isn't a word one often hears in a business context today, 25 years later. At the time, he was very specific about many things. One is that it wouldn't be funded from a foundation. It had to be funded internally through the budget process. We would focus on 3 things: environmental stewardship, human rights, and citizen service. And we would become a top decile company in the world at all 3. and not talk about it. And so over the course of my tenure there, when I was Chief Operating Officer working for Jeff, who led the company, he spent most of his time on that agenda and I spent most of my time on a traditional agenda, but they of course overlapped. But I got to work for someone who controlled the company and genuinely believed that business had a responsibility to humanity that's different from a traditional executive, I would say. And so we got to do great things. We were the first public company to give all employees 40 hours of paid community service. We powered our factories with renewable energy well before it was economic. We installed the largest solar array in the state of California at the time in our DC.
[00:05:23.170] - Ken Pucker We had John Lewis, the civil rights hero, come to our sales meeting every fall to give out the award to the employee who was kind of the paragon of citizen service. So we did lots of really cool things and I enjoyed being there and the company grew 10 times when I was there. So I got to do lots of things I probably didn't deserve to do on paper. So all good. Yeah. To reflect on and understand the environmental piece of our agenda. I understood the human rights piece and the citizen service piece. I wasn't schooled in climate change and I didn't fully understand the environmental piece. And so I went to— when I went to study that and to figure out how big the problem was and how much we were contributing to the solution to the problem, I got more and more concerned about both the scale of the problem and also our role. And one example will illustrate that probably, and it's a bit wonky, but The way that greenhouse gas emissions are measured are across 3 scopes: Scope 1, 2, and 3. Scope 1 is the emissions kind of onsite. Scope 2 is purchased electricity.
[00:06:26.420] - Ken Pucker And Scope 3 is 15 categories. It's everything else upstream and downstream. And when I was at Timberland, we reported annually on what our emissions were and we grew double digits for 7 straight years and our emissions declined by double digits for 7 straight years. And we were proud of that, rightly so.
[00:06:42.050] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:06:42.770] - Ken Pucker But when you looked at the footnotes in our reporting, you'd see that that was Scope 1 and 2 emissions.
[00:06:47.100] - Joe Murphy Yeah. Okay.
[00:06:48.040] - Ken Pucker And Scope 3 emissions, which we weren't able to measure at the time, we would have had to measure over 500,000 data points to measure that, were 96% of our total. So we were congratulating ourselves for reducing 4% of emissions 10% a year, let's say, while the 96% we weren't measuring—
[00:07:07.650] - Joe Murphy Was invisible.
[00:07:09.000] - Ken Pucker And so grumpy. Roll the tape forward 25 years, and now there is more measurement. of Scope 3 emissions. But if you look at CDP, which is the clearinghouse for this information globally, less than half of companies that report, public companies that report to CDP, even report on their Scope 3 emissions, let alone set a target for reduction.
[00:07:31.460] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:07:32.300] - Ken Pucker So we have this problem that's existential called climate change. We have companies saying they're in, they're committed to addressing it, and we don't even measure let alone set targets for how we're gonna address the problem 25 years later, which makes me grumpy.
[00:07:48.870] - Joe Murphy And that's understandable. And obviously, this whole conversation is about how the work needs to change going forward. So what do we need to draw from those failures or those gaps and do differently? But when you refer to Sustainability Inc., which I think is a really nice way of coining it, that's what you refer to, right? There's a whole industry of NGOs and business commitments and investors trying to go after some of these solutions. But your point is they're actually potentially being counterproductive at times because we're missing some of the bigger ticket opportunities.
[00:08:29.410] - Ken Pucker So I think that's fair what you've— how you've characterized things. I would say that Sustainability Inc. is, as you rightly note, a whole bunch of different actors. almost all well-intended, but almost all overselling the ability of the private sector on its own to address market failures. Yeah. And climate change and CO2 emissions are a market failure, meaning if I'm a company like Timberland and the factories in which I work are emitting carbon and not paying for it, right, because it's unpriced in most of the world, there's a failure of the market to incorporate that price and therefore we overproduce. Are we underpriced relative to what the real social costs are?
[00:09:15.310] - Joe Murphy The true costs.
[00:09:16.110] - Ken Pucker Yes. And so asking a business to address that while its peers aren't creates a free rider problem that is not tenable. And so we have an infrastructure, for example, academics, consultants selling this notion of the business case for corporate sustainability. They point to illustrations that are valid, things like replacing traditional light bulbs with LED light bulbs or reducing waste and the ROI associated with that. Really cool, really valid. And things that executives will pursue on their own because they're profit motivated.
[00:09:54.820] - Joe Murphy They just work. They work. They work in the current system.
[00:09:56.910] - Ken Pucker It's not sustainability. It's just a good idea, right? But there's, out of the 20 such ideas, 19 of them maybe Maybe 18 of them don't make economic sense because of market failure, and those don't get funded. And so we overamp the ability of business on its own to address problems that it won't structurally, not because executives are bad or not because they don't want to, but because structurally the system is set up with incentives that reward other things. Yeah.
[00:10:29.530] - Joe Murphy So we've got to be working— I mean, the so what on that then, and what do we need to do differently has to be spending more time focusing on the market itself. So what are the dynamics, rules of the game that drive the market that can actually make some of these solutions just more competitive so they outcompete the status quo or outcompete the linear alternative? But how do we do that? I mean, it's all about policy change because we also know that there's fragility in relying, over-relying on state action and policy to do all of the work. So What do we need to do differently?
[00:11:05.550] - Ken Pucker So I do think changing rules is important, and that is policy. I've been working for 5 years, for example, on trying to pass the first piece of legislation in the United States that governs the fashion industry. There's almost no regulation of fashion. Fashion's an increasingly large contributor of things like effluent and water use and waste and CO2 emissions. And so I've worked with a woman named Maxine Bédard at the New Standard Institute to introduce legislation in the state of New York and now California that would mandate kind of baby steps on the agenda towards addressing market failure. So for example, the law says if you're a company that is selling in the state of New York with revenues in excess of $1 billion, you would have to annually report on your CO2 emissions across all 3 scopes. You'd have to sign up for science-based targets, which means commitments to reduce your emissions in keeping with planetary boundaries. And if you didn't do that, you'd be given a remedy period of 18 months. If you still didn't deliver that, the attorney general at his or her discretion could fine the company up to 2% of global revenue, which could be a lot.
[00:12:13.470] - Ken Pucker In the case of the company I worked for, that would have been a $45 million fine. Yeah. And so I believe that we need both carrots and sticks to get business to change behavior. And that's what we were trying to do with this legislation. Why I say it's hard is because We, over a 4 or 5 year period, have built up a consortium of supporters that is mostly NGOs or innovators or suppliers with a select few companies, most of which are— actually, all of which are private companies. And they're the suspects you'd suspect. It would be Faraday and Stella McCartney and Ganni and Patagonia and Eileen Fisher. Not a single public company. has signed up to support the legislation, notwithstanding there are many that have signed up for science-based targets, meaning they've already committed to this journey.
[00:13:01.290] - Joe Murphy So why is that?
[00:13:02.820] - Ken Pucker Companies don't like to be regulated. Okay. And as much as they want the outcomes that are societal, they don't want their costs to go up. Right? Net costs go up, you typically sell less. Our point is, wait a minute, there's already people doing this. And so what we want to do is lift the floor. to the level of people that are doing it. So it's fair and everyone can collectively work towards solutions.
[00:13:25.760] - Joe Murphy But it's interesting when you say that, that they are already doing it.
[00:13:30.260] - Ken Pucker Some are committing to—
[00:13:31.050] - Joe Murphy So they're already on the floor.
[00:13:32.270] - Ken Pucker They don't want the fine, meaning they're committing to measurement and they're committing to science-based targets. But McKinsey just released a study that looked at fashion companies that are public over $1 billion and looked at what percentage of them are on path to deliver on their Scope 3 targets? And the answer was less than 1 in 4.
[00:13:52.080] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:13:53.160] - Ken Pucker So they— I think most companies do want this agenda to happen.
[00:13:56.830] - Joe Murphy It massively increases the jeopardy for them, right? Because then obviously even today, if you miss a target, you have a huge brand risk and a communications challenge.
[00:14:05.860] - Ken Pucker I wish.
[00:14:06.520] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:14:07.220] - Ken Pucker I know. I don't agree. That's what I'm saying. You don't agree that— No, see, I think if you're a CEO, imagine being a CEO and getting on a call every 90 days and telling Wall Street, hey, look, I've got great news. We missed our sales target by 10%, but our carbon went down by 15%.
[00:14:21.160] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:14:21.500] - Ken Pucker And our water usage went down by 20%. And we're proud of those results. The first question isn't going to be, tell me about that carbon reduction. It's going to be, did you just say your sales went down by double digits? And it's because the goals that we set for financial performance come with consequence. The ones we set for non-financial performance, meaning environmental social performance, get reset. And so there's no evidence that says that companies that miss a target and reset are influenced by the markets in terms of pain. Right? So you could say they'd be embarrassed. You could say no one wants to reset. All fair. Right? But at the end of the day, if you're an executive and you have limited time and space and money, you should today, based on the incentives, work harder to hit your financial goals than your water usage.
[00:15:14.400] - Joe Murphy Yeah, and you actually see that in executive incentives as well, right? The weighting will be totally skewed. I mean, it is an interesting point. And we have that in our work where we've seen a number of companies make big commitments on their plastics packaging and actually miss targets because the targets were very aggressive and ambitious. But then we've been able to demonstrate, but they have outperformed the market, which goes to the free rider point that you brought up earlier. So if those dynamics persist, what's the way through? I mean, that piece of legislation, what is the next step on actually turning that from a good idea into rules of the game?
[00:15:57.040] - Ken Pucker So 2 things. One, on the research where you've demonstrated that these companies that are tending to these risks outperform, you have to answer the question of causation versus correlation. Meaning it— I'm not saying what you're saying is incorrect. I'm just saying it may be that those companies are outperforming because they have better management teams, and better management teams can think more aggressively about risks, and therefore they tend to the risks you're describing, and therefore they're outperforming, which would mean they're not outperforming because of plastic reduction. They're outperforming because they have better management teams. Great, I'm happy for both, right? But it doesn't mean that plastic— attention to plastic delivers outperformance. And I think people get confused by that. In terms of way forward, I don't think that the answer is in relying on consumers or investors as we've tried. Consumers are busy. In the case of fashion, they have been promised things for years without substantiation. eco-friendly, natural, eco-efficient, sustainable. What do these definitions mean? And I think they've gotten cynical.
[00:17:10.220] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:17:10.930] - Ken Pucker And asking someone to spend an hour reading a lifecycle analysis of a cotton t-shirt versus a nylon t-shirt is not reasonable.
[00:17:19.470] - Joe Murphy Yeah, I think that, yeah, I think that that kind of, that gap between values and actions, I mean, you know, well proven. At the same time, we do see where you, Sometimes that does come down to just better marketing. So we do see, if I give an example of Back Market, who sell refurbished electronics, their whole business is to sell the attributes of buying refurbished versus buying new. And I think they do much better marketing because they throw everything at it.
[00:17:49.880] - Ken Pucker And because they have a brilliant CMO named Joy Howard, who's fabulous.
[00:17:54.120] - Joe Murphy Well, there you go, right? Because you've got the right brains working on the right problems as opposed to a sort of sustainability angle coming into a product where you're not gonna get the big marketing dollars and the marketing team's attention to it 'cause it's a bit of a niche.
[00:18:09.460] - Ken Pucker I think that's brilliant because, you know, their business is a sustainability business, Back Market. There are other businesses in fashion who are legitimately premising their value add on sustainability. People like Houdini Sportswear, Patagonia, and they develop a reputation that is trustworthy. And so consumers aren't looking at this fleece versus that, they're just looking at the brand, okay? But those are few and far between.
[00:18:33.410] - Joe Murphy Yeah.
[00:18:34.380] - Ken Pucker To try to circle back to your question, okay, so what's the answer? And I said, not consumer. We've spent 10 years now looking at this question of investor with ESG, et cetera. That's a separate podcast. But I think there's sufficient evidence to say now that most public market ESG funds are undifferentiated from traditional funds and they're secondary market vehicles. And so they don't move the needle. So my view is it's citizens, meaning policy, okay? We have to convince companies that their consumers are citizens and citizens have to demand more of policymakers. Otherwise policymakers won't make the changes that are required.
[00:19:16.050] - Joe Murphy But, and so what, have you seen any examples from your work of good tactics or strategies to actually, from a, almost from a corporate side, to actually be leaning in to try and catalyze some of that you know, some of that citizen-level action? Because at the same time as saying we need to create more pressure on the politicians, the polarization we've got in politics is just making any progress on anything extremely difficult. So how do we— if you are a business and you are, you know, you're back in Timberland now, imagine, and you're trying to drive this agenda and you think actually it's about how do we start to build more of the pressure on the politicians to make the changes? Yeah. How do you, how would you approach that?
[00:20:02.950] - Ken Pucker So I don't think, to be clear, most companies will behave the way we're describing. Patagonia certainly does. Okay, they're an activist. There's an organization here in London called Influence Map, which is brilliant, run by a guy named Dylan Tanner. And what they do is they look at companies' focus on policy and then they go to companies and share, look, you say you're pro-addressing climate change, but you're a member of the International Chamber of Commerce who lobbies aggressively against climate legislation. Yeah. You— and here are the trade associations you're part of. Here's the money you've spent on lobbying. And they make that information public, which I think is a real service to consumers/citizens. But I don't think companies themselves are going to ask people to go to the streets to march for EPR. that it's not gonna happen, I don't think. I think it has to be grassroots.
[00:20:58.940] - Joe Murphy Yeah. And well, I think one of the things that we have seen, so we are, you know, we're obviously an NGO, we engage in a lot of advocacy, we would say, like in a softer term. And, you know, we carry some weight because we're credibility and we're independent and we have data and analysis. But we've found that we are much stronger if we're able to show up in a policy advocacy forum with business backing behind us to say, yes, we also endorse and agree with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation's position on these things. And so I think that whole playbook of how do we do almost like lobbying or advocacy 2.0 feels like we're at— that's probably what needs to be cracked, or that's one of the things that needs to be different.
[00:21:44.430] - Ken Pucker I agree. And I've failed at it, so I'm not here to provide good advice. We've tried, for example, on the Fashion Act to work with the largest trade associations associations to advocate for the legislation. And privately they say, we're all for this, but we can't say anything publicly because our membership's so diverse and many of our big sponsors won't like us advocating publicly. We've talked to large progressive public companies in the space who'll say the same thing. Meaning you'll get through the sustainability team and then it'll make it to the general counsel and they'll be, absolutely not. We'll support the legislation if enacted, but we won't be the first public company to say out loud we support it. And I still don't understand that, given that the leaders that I'm describing are already doing it. But there's a lot of caution around public statements that are pro-regulation.
[00:22:42.300] - Joe Murphy Yeah. One thought I have with this whole, the whole policy-setting agenda is the timeframes are so long. It's extremely complicated. Policymakers don't want to change things and then have the unintended consequences. One of the things that I'm missing a little bit when I look at this sort of is a bit more experimentation or a bit more willingness to say, well, how do we find pilot, not to go back to pilots, but not pilots that are just businesses testing refill in store X, but pilots where we're trying to bring together engagement with local policymakers at a city level to say, well, what would a scheme look like with these set of incentives, with some business engagement that would actually do some of the piloting of the actual systems that we need to scale. And one of the issues I see is how do we get to a place where we can be a bit more co-creational and a bit more experimental with the policymaking process itself? I don't know if you'd have any reactions to that.
[00:23:42.620] - Ken Pucker Well, there is a good case study now, which is on pricing of carbon. Um, carbon tax, essentially. It goes by different names in different jurisdictions, but around the world right now, about 30% of the world has some form of carbon tax in place already. Different manifestations, different prices, different mechanisms, but the EU has a trading scheme. China is now rolling out carbon pricing. And there's evidence that, you know, as a result of that, those are the places that are decarbonizing faster. Right. Which isn't surprising because they're addressing what I mentioned before, which is market failure. And there's lots of different ways to do it. CBAM is another way to do it. But there are experiments going on that are delivering decarbonization at a pace that's much faster than where those mechanisms aren't in place.
[00:24:32.030] - Joe Murphy Yeah. Great. Thank you, Ken. So what's the sum-up on that?
[00:24:38.740] - Ken Pucker The sum-up is I'm glad I wore socks. That's my first one. Me too. And my sum-up is I think we'd be better off were we to be more candid with each other about the limits of what corporate voluntary action can deliver. I'm not against it. I'm very pro.
[00:24:55.420] - Joe Murphy Yeah, it's necessary but not sufficient.
[00:24:57.590] - Ken Pucker Absolutely. And so this— the overselling, I think, does us harm because I think it minimizes pressure for the right actions from a policy perspective.
[00:25:07.690] - Joe Murphy Yeah. And opening up that playbook and acknowledging that we are we probably need to find new tactics and approaches there.
[00:25:13.890] - Ken Pucker Yes.
[00:25:14.710] - Joe Murphy Great. Thanks so much for taking the time.
[00:25:16.930] - Ken Pucker Thank you for having me.
[00:25:18.110] - Joe Murphy Safe travels back.
[00:25:19.140] - Ken Pucker Thank you.
[00:25:19.840] - Joe Murphy So that's the chat with Ken. He's not such a grumpy guy. And great socks as well. I hope you noticed that. I think my key takeaway from the conversation is I agree. I agree with his provocation. I think there are lots of well-intended but probably misguided initiatives out there, and there's lots of dollars being spent that aren't driving the return that we want to see. But I don't think we've got a clear answer of exactly what is working or what will work. And that's the point behind these conversations. So big thanks to Ken. Thanks for listening and see you on the next one.








